
Washington Nationals · Featured story
Toboni did not spend his first year chasing a quick fix. He spent it building one.
By Richard Wachtel | October 15, 2026
Photo by Ryan Shenker for the Nats Report

Jan. 22, 2026
Toboni sent the Nationals’ best starter to Texas for five prospects: Gavin Fien, Alejandro Rosario, Abimelec Ortiz, Devin Fitz-Gerald and Yeremy Cabrera.
Paul Toboni did not spend his first year running the Washington Nationals chasing a quick fix.
He spent it building one.
When Toboni took over as president of baseball operations last fall, he inherited a franchise still searching for a dependable way back. His answer was not a splashy free-agent class or a promise that Washington would contend immediately. It was a longer, more ambitious bet: change how the Nationals find players, develop them, evaluate them, and decide when to buy, sell, or hold.
Toboni has described the goal as building a “scouting and player development monster”—an organization capable of producing talent year after year instead of restarting every few seasons. That vision reaches every corner of baseball operations, from scouting and analytics to coaching, clubhouse culture, and the decision to hire Blake Butera as manager.
The Nationals finished 2026 at 77-85, an 11-win improvement and their best record since 2019. That matters.
But it is not really the point.
The point is that Toboni spent Year One trying to change what the Nationals are—and whether Washington can finally build something that lasts.
Toboni’s first major investment was not a free agent.
It was infrastructure.
The Nationals upgraded technology, equipment, staffing, and communication across player development. The idea was simple: stop treating improvement as a series of individual coaching fixes and start building a system that can develop players at scale.
That included adding three Trajekt pitching machines at a cost of roughly $500,000 each—technology that nearly every team in baseball already had before Washington purchased them at the start of this year. It was not a glamorous move, but it was a necessary one. Toboni’s blueprint depends on giving the development staff modern tools, not asking coaches to teach with outdated resources.
The Nationals also expanded their staffing throughout the minor leagues. In Rochester, manager Matt LeCroy went from a six-person staff to an 11-person staff, adding a second hitting coach, a second pitching coach, a third-base coach focused on defense, and a first-base coach responsible for quality control. Washington also added an extra trainer, an additional strength and conditioning coach, and a video coordinator. Similar upgrades extended across all four levels of the organization.
The message was clear: coaching is teaching, and Toboni wanted to give his minor-league managers enough people to actually teach.
That shows up in the details. Players now receive individualized development plans with measurable priorities and expectations. Once a player is drafted, the organization maps out his first month in the system, then reassesses and adjusts over the next 30 days.
Hitting director CJ Gillman said one of the organization’s biggest competitive advantages was picking the low-hanging fruit and simplifying its messaging to players. Rather than overwhelming them with information, the Nationals focused on clear priorities and repeatable habits.
The draft became part of the process, too.
Washington created development reports on roughly its top 200 draft targets, identifying how the organization would train each player before selecting him. The front office also brought its new directors of hitting and pitching into acquisition decisions, tying draft strategy directly to what the development staff believed it could improve.
That is the core of Toboni’s approach: acquire players the organization understands how to develop, then give them the structure and resources to improve.
The early results were striking. In 2025, Washington’s four full-season minor-league teams finished a combined 53 games under .500. This season, those same teams finished 77 games over .500.
The improvement showed up in individual development, too. Jarlin Susana drew attention with a strong Arizona Fall League performance, earning AFL Pitcher of the Week honors. The Nationals’ pipeline also features 2025 No. 1 overall pick Eli Willits, ranked No. 21 on Baseball America’s Top 100, who was promoted to High-A Wilmington. In June, middle infielder Devin Fitz-Gerald and outfielders Ethan Petry and T.J. White earned promotions to Double-A Harrisburg.
The gains went beyond individual names. No farm system in baseball saw a bigger year-over-year jump in pitchers’ fastball velocity and strikeout rate, or in hitters’ home run rate. No farm system also had a more improved offense by wRC+ or a better pitching staff by ERA.
Toboni believes that progress is real—but incomplete.
“I think we’ve made meaningful strides, but I do not think we’re there yet,” Toboni told The Athletic. “If we’re going to achieve that, we need to have a ton of talent. … I think a lot of what has to come down the line just has to do with time. The more opportunities we hopefully have to make good trades, acquire players in the draft, the international signing period, the more opportunities we have to fill the cupboard with players that can impact us down the line.”
That is the blueprint in its simplest form: build the infrastructure, improve the players already in the system, and keep adding talent through the draft, trades, and international signing.
But development alone cannot complete a contender. Toboni also had to reshape the way Washington acquired talent—using trades to turn established players into young, controllable pieces who fit the system he was building.
Toboni’s trades made his philosophy visible.He was not simply trying to add prospects. He was trying to reshape the way Washington acquires talent: sell players while their value remained high, acquire young players the organization believed it could develop, and keep feeding a system designed to turn potential into major-league production.His first major deal set the tone.Toboni sent reliever José Ferrer to Seattle for catcher Harry Ford and pitching prospect Isaac Lyon.
Washington gave up a young bullpen arm for a former top catching prospect a move that prioritized long-term positional value over immediate relief depth.Then came the bigger swing.
Then came the bigger swing.
Toboni traded MacKenzie Gore to Texas for five prospects, dealing the Nationals’ best starter despite a thin rotation. It was a difficult decision, especially for a team trying to become more competitive. But it followed the same logic: acquire future upside rather than hold onto an established pitcher whose value might not remain this high.
The trade deadline followed the same pattern. Washington was still in Wild Card contention, yet Toboni moved Curtis Mead, Luis García Jr., Foster Griffin, and Christian Franklin, converting productive major-league pieces into young pitching and prospects.
None of it felt random.
Toboni was selling at high value, buying players whose development the Nationals believed they could maximize, and keeping the pipeline moving. The goal was not to collect talent for the sake of it. It was to build a system that knew what to do with it.Every acquisition had to fit a larger purpose.
Could the player improve in Washington’s development system? Did he fill a long-term need? Did he give the Nationals a realistic path to becoming more than a short-term contributor?
Those questions mattered as much as prospect rankings or immediate returns. That approach also required patience for both the organization and yes it’s fans. Some of the players Toboni acquired may not reach the majors for years.
Others may develop into trade chips, depth pieces, or eventual building blocks. But the point was to give Washington more ways to add talent through the draft, international signing, and trades rather than relying on one pathway to fix the roster.
But trading is only half of the equation. Toboni also needs players worth keeping young, controllable pieces who can become the foundation of the next competitive Nationals team. Development can create opportunity, but sustained contention requires identifying the right players and building around them.

October 1, 2025
Paul Toboni is introduced as the President of Baseball Operations for the Washington Nationals.
Dec. 6, 2025
Traded LHP José Ferrer to Seattle for C Harry Ford and RHP Isaac Lyon. Toboni’s first trade as Nationals president of baseball operations.
Dec. 15, 2025
Traded LHP Jake Bennett to Texas in a prospect-for-prospect deal centered on RHP Luis Perales.
Jan. 22, 2026
Traded LHP MacKenzie Gore to Texas for five prospects: 3B Gavin Fien, RHP Alejandro Rosario, 1B/OF Abimelec Ortiz, SS Devin Fitz-Gerald and OF Yeremy Cabrera.
May 5, 2026
Signed RHP Max Kranick to a one-year major-league contract with a 2027 option.
July 19, 2026
Signed LHP Matt Krook to a one-year major-league contract.
July 25, 2026
Traded INF Curtis Mead to Boston for LHP Connelly Early.
Aug. 2, 2026
Traded INF Luis García Jr. to the Yankees for RHPs Jake Bird, Yovanny Cruz, Jack Cebert and Ben Grable.
Aug. 3, 2026
Traded OF Christian Franklin to Baltimore for RHP Joe Glassey.
Aug. 3, 2026
Traded LHP Foster Griffin to Cleveland for LHPs Josh Hartle and Will Dion, RHP Kendeglys Virguez, and OF Nick Mitchell.
Aug. 31, 2026
RHP Trevor Williams cleared waivers and became a free agent.
Sept. 1, 2026
Selected the contracts of 1B Yohandy Morales and LHP Jared Simpson from Rochester; transferred C Drew Millas to the 60-day injured list.
Sept. 18, 2026
Signed RHP Cade Cavalli to a four-year extension covering 2027-30, with a club option for 2031.
Sept. 29, 2026
C Riley Adams refused a minor-league assignment and became a free agent.
Oct. 8, 2026
RHPs Max Kranick and Justin Lawrence refused minor-league assignments and became free agents.
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That is where Cade Cavalli comes in.
The Cade Cavalli extension was the clearest sign that Toboni’s plan is not built entirely around trading and developing.
On Sept. 18, Washington signed Cavalli to a four-year extension covering 2027-30, with a club option for 2031. The deal keeps a homegrown starter in the organization through what should be the most important years of the Nationals’ competitive window.
It also sent a message: the Nationals want to keep the players they develop, not simply trade them when their value rises.
“We want to build around people who embody what we want this organization to be, and Cade fits that perfectly,” Toboni said. “We talk a lot about creating a culture of growth, and Cade’s a great example of that.”
“He’s never stopped working on ways to get better,” Toboni added. “We want players to know that if they come here and they work and they grow and they contribute, there is a pathway to being part of something long-term here.”
Cavalli is not yet a finished product, and Washington still needs pitching around him. But the extension gives the rotation a potential anchor and gives Toboni a cost-controlled building block entering the offseason.
That matters because Toboni’s rebuild depends on more than accumulating prospects. It depends on identifying which young players can become core pieces, then building around them with targeted additions. Cavalli gives him one of those pieces: a homegrown starter under club control who can anchor the rotation while Washington adds around him.
For Toboni, the deal completed the equation: develop talent, identify the players worth building around, and keep them before the market makes that harder.
Blake Butera is the on-field half of Toboni’s plan.
When Toboni hired the then-33-year-old former Rays farm director, he passed over more traditional managerial candidates in favor of someone whose career had been built around developing players. Butera had never managed in the majors, but his background in Tampa Bay’s player-development system made him an unusually natural fit for what Toboni was trying to build.
At 33, Butera became MLB’s youngest manager in more than 50 years. The hire only makes sense if the Nationals’ priority is long-term development rather than short-term optics.
“He’s coming from the front office, overseeing player development,” Toboni said. “That hasn’t happened very frequently throughout baseball.”
Toboni and Butera have worked closely together since, including as they shaped the 2026 coaching staff.
“That’ll be Blake Butera and I primarily tackling it together,” Toboni said at Butera’s introductory press conference. “We’re incredibly aligned about how we think through this.”
Butera’s job is to take the front office’s plans and turn them into daily behavior: standards, accountability, honest feedback, and an environment where young players can improve without being protected from failure.
That meant setting expectations early and making sure young players understood that opportunity came with responsibility. It also meant creating a clubhouse where coaches, analysts, and players communicated openly rather than operating in separate silos—and holding his staff accountable for their actions on and off the field.
Working with younger players was a natural fit for Butera. He had spent years working with minor-league players, helping them navigate the transition from prospect to major-leaguer. He understood the developmental side of the game: the routines, the setbacks, the adjustments, and the patience required to turn talent into production.
With a roster built around young players still finding their way in the majors, that experience is central to Washington’s future success.
His first season offered reasons to believe the bet could work. Washington became more competitive, and players consistently praised Butera’s ability to connect with the roster, including James Wood and CJ Abrams. Together, Wood and Abrams became the fifth pair of teammates in MLB history to post 30 home runs, 30 doubles, and 30 stolen bases in the same season—evidence that Washington’s young core was beginning to produce at a higher level.
The Nationals were not perfect. They still had stretches where young players struggled, pitching collapsed, or games slipped away late. But the team’s overall improvement suggested that Butera’s message was beginning to take hold.
The 85 losses are the limit of that argument. Development only matters if it becomes execution, and Washington still lacks the pitching depth and overall roster quality to sustain a contender. Butera acknowledged as much after the final game, saying the Nationals felt they had “left a lot of meat on the bone.”
For Toboni, that was always the point. He did not hire Butera simply to manage games or chase a quick improvement in the standings. He hired him to help create the kind of clubhouse where young players could be developed, challenged, and prepared for the next stage of Washington’s build.
But development can only take a team so far. The Nationals still need more talent around their young core—especially pitching and bullpen help—and Toboni enters the winter with the flexibility to pursue it.
How he uses that flexibility may determine whether Year Two becomes another step forward, or the moment the rebuild begins to stall.
Toboni’s second offseason is the first real stress test of the blueprint.The Nationals enter the winter with roughly $57.3 million committed, about $25 million less than any other MLB club, according to an offseason projection.
That creates flexibility—and pressure.Washington needs at least one quality starter and multiple bullpen upgrades. Toboni has acknowledged the central question: add external pitching now, or preserve opportunities for young internal arms? His public answer has been flexibility.
After the season, Toboni said the Nationals would be “super open-minded” about improving through internal development, promotions, free agency, or trades.This is where Toboni’s blueprint faces its first financial test.
Development can create opportunity, but payroll determines how much talent surrounds the young core. The Nationals do not need to spend recklessly; they need to spend with purpose adding pitchers and bullpen help that improve the 2027 team without blocking the players Washington is trying to develop.
That means targeted pitching, selective bullpen spending, and avoiding short-term additions that get in the way of the organization’s long-term plan.
Washington needs at least one quality starter and multiple bullpen upgrades. Toboni has acknowledged the central question: add external pitching now, or preserve opportunities for young internal arms?
His public answer has been flexibility. After the season, Toboni said the Nationals would be “super open-minded” about improving through internal development, promotions, free agency, or trades.
The challenge is to spend without undermining the pipeline. Toboni has said payroll should be used creatively through free agency or extensions, in ways that improve the team next season while preserving a strong future.
Sept. 18, 2026
A four-year extension covers 2027-30, with a club option for 2031, keeping a homegrown starter through the Nationals’ competitive window.

Now comes the harder part.
Year Two does not need to end with a playoff berth for Toboni’s plan to be working. But it does need to answer bigger questions than Year One did.
Can the Nationals turn their improved development system into more impact players at the major-league level?
Can young hitters such as James Wood, CJ Abrams, and the next wave of prospects become more consistent driving forces rather than occasional sparks?
Can the pitching staff still the organization’s biggest question produce enough dependable innings to keep Washington in games?
The Nationals also need to show that their improved farm system can become a practical roster-building tool.
Toboni’s trades were designed to add talent, but the next step is turning that talent into major-league contributors. A successful Year Two would include more prospects forcing their way into the conversation, more internal pitching options becoming viable, and more evidence that Washington can develop players who improve the big-league club rather than simply improve its prospect rankings.
There is also a competitive standard to meet. Washington improved by 11 wins in Year One, but the next step is harder: turning close losses into wins, avoiding long skids, and playing meaningful baseball deeper into the season.
The Nationals do not need to win the NL East in 2027, but they need to show that the foundation is beginning to support a real contender.That is the difference between a promising rebuild and a stalled one. Year One was about installing the system.
Year Two has to show the system is starting to produce results.
The Nationals finally look like they have one.
Now they have to prove it can win.

The on-field half
At 33, MLB’s youngest manager in more than 50 years, hired to turn the front office’s plan into daily habits.